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NOTE 
The Quest for Equal Dignity: Federal 
Statutory Protection Against Sexual 
Orientation Discrimination 
Walsh v. Friendship Village of South County, 352 F. Supp. 3d 920 (E.D. Mo. 
2019). 
Alec D. Guy* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over one million Americans are married to someone of the same sex.1  
Although the United States Supreme Court guaranteed the fundamental right 
of marriage to same-sex couples in 2015,2 these individuals can still be denied 
housing or fired from their dream job after getting legally married.3  For much 
of history, gay individuals have not been protected by the law, both statutorily 
and constitutionally.  Private individuals are generally still free to discriminate 
against gay people today because federal statutes rarely prohibit discrimination 
based on sexual orientation.  Consequently, many have argued that sexual ori-
entation discrimination constitutes unlawful discrimination based on sex.  Until 
  
*  B.S. Political Science and Economics, Missouri Western State University, 2017; J.D. 
Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2020.  I would like to thank Professor 
Alexander for her insight and guidance during the writing of this Note, as well as the 
Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process. 
 1. Adam P. Romero, Estimates of Marriages of Same-Sex Couples at the Two-
Year Anniversary of Obergefell v. Hodges, THE WILLIAMS INST. (June 2017), 
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Obergefell-2-Year-Mar-
riages.pdf [perma.cc/GW8R-6FLX].  
 2. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015). 
 3. See Walsh v. Friendship Vill. of South Cty., 352 F. Supp. 3d 920, 925 (E.D. 
Mo. 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-1395 (8th Cir. Feb. 27, 2019); Zarda v. Altitude 
Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
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recently, these arguments were summarily dismissed, as nearly all federal cir-
cuit courts held sexual orientation is not a protected class.4  Some courts, how-
ever, have revisited precedent and held that discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation constitutes unlawful sex discrimination.5     
In Walsh v. Friendship Village, the plaintiffs, a same-sex couple, sued a 
senior living community under the Fair Housing Act (the “FHA”), alleging dis-
crimination based on sex.6  The district court, bound by Eighth Circuit prece-
dent, denied the claim.7  This Note, in addition to explaining the Walsh deci-
sion, discusses Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the FHA, and federal case law 
that bears on whether sexual orientation discrimination is a subset of unlawful 
sex discrimination.  This Note ultimately argues that sexual orientation dis-
crimination constitutes unlawful sex discrimination based on Supreme Court 
precedent and a plain language analysis of Title VII and the FHA.   
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
In 2009, Mary Walsh and Beverly Nance were legally married in Massa-
chusetts after being in a committed relationship for nearly forty years.8  At the 
beginning of the present lawsuit, Walsh was seventy-two years old and Nance 
was sixty-eight years old.9  In 2016, with hopes of moving to senior housing, 
Walsh and Nance began researching Friendship Village, a senior living com-
munity that opened in 1978.10  Walsh and Nance visited the facility and spoke 
with residents as well as staff, including the Residence Director, Carmen 
Fronczack.11  In July of 2016, Walsh and Nance paid a $2000 deposit and 
signed up for a waiting list to live at Friendship Village.12 
A few months later, Fronczack asked Walsh about her relationship with 
Nance, and Walsh explained that she and Nance were married.13  The next day, 
  
 4. See, e.g., Blum v. Golf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979); William-
son v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989); Wrightson v. Pizza 
Hut of America, Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996); Fredette v. BVP Mgmt. Assocs., 112 
F.3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 
259 (1st Cir. 1999); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005), 
overruled by Zarda, 883 F.3d at 100; Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 
1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms., Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 292 (3d Cir. 
2009); Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 470 (6th Cir. 2012); Hively v. 
Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 5. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 341. 
 6. Walsh, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 924; Zarda, 883 F.3d at 108. 
 7. Walsh, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 926, 928. 
 8. Id. at 922.  
 9. Id. at 923.  
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id.  
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Fronczack informed Walsh that, due to Friendship Village’s Cohabitation Pol-
icy (the “Policy”), Walsh and Nance could not share a single unit.14  Addition-
ally, Walsh later received a letter that recited the Policy and reiterated this de-
cision.15  The Policy stated that Friendship Village operates in accordance with 
biblical principles, as well as religious standards, and cohabitation is permitted 
only if the two individuals are spouses by marriage, parent and child, or sib-
lings.16  The term marriage was defined as “the union of one man and one 
woman.”17  The Policy had been applied for many years and continued to apply 
to new residents.18 
In October 2016, Walsh and Nance filed a complaint alleging unlawful 
sex discrimination with the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”).19  HUD referred the complaint to the Missouri Com-
mission on Human Rights (“MCHR”), but, around a month later, MCHR vol-
untarily sent the complaint back to HUD.20  HUD then investigated from De-
cember 2016 to June 2018.21   
In July 2018, Walsh and Nance elected to pursue their claim in federal 
court.22  They first alleged sex discrimination under both the FHA and the Mis-
souri Human Rights Act, but the latter claim was removed in an amended com-
plaint.23  Walsh and Nance advanced three arguments: (1) they were treated 
less favorably due to their sex; (2) they were treated less favorably due to their 
association with another person of a particular sex; and (3) they were treated 
less favorably because they did not conform to various, traditional sex stereo-
types.24  The alleged stereotypes included “that a married woman should be in 
a different-sex relationship; that a married woman’s spouse should be a man; 
and that women should be attracted to and form relationships with men, not 
women.”25   
Friendship Village filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, contend-
ing that the complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could be 
  
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. (“It is the policy of Friendship Village Sunset Hills, consistent with its long-
standing practice of operating its facilities in accordance with biblical principles and 
sincerely-held religious standards, that it will permit the cohabitation of residents 
within a single unit only if those residents, while residing in said unit, are related as 
spouses by marriage, as parent and child or as siblings.”). 
 17. Id. (“The term ‘marriage’ as used in this policy means the union of one man 
and one woman, as marriage is understood in the Bible. . . .”). 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. at 923–24. 
 21. Id. at 924.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. at 925.  
 25. Id. at 924.  
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granted.26  The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri 
granted Friendship Village’s motion.27  The court held that the sex discrimina-
tion claim and gender stereotyping claims were truly based on sexual orienta-
tion, which is an unprotected class.28  Further, the court denied the second 
claim, associational discrimination, because Walsh and Nance did not show 
such claims were actionable for statutorily unprotected classes.29   
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Under Title VII and the FHA, sexual orientation is not explicitly covered 
as a protected class.  First, this Part details the history of federal antidiscrimi-
nation statutes, such as Title VII and the FHA.  Next, this Part turns to federal 
case law, which continues to evolve.  Early decisions dismissed the idea that 
unlawful sex discrimination encompasses discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation with very little discussion.  Intermediate decisions were more sympa-
thetic but continued to deny protection.  While some circuit courts continue to 
follow precedent, others have determined that discrimination based on sexual 
orientation is impermissible under federal statutes. 
A.  Federal Statutes 
Over fifty years ago, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the “1964 Act”) was 
signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson after five amendments and over 500 
hours of debate in Congress.30  The 1964 Act prohibits discrimination in many 
types of conduct, including public accommodations, governmental services, 
and education.31  Title VII of the 1964 Act, which applies to private employers, 
labor unions, and employment agencies, forbids employment discrimination 
based on race, sex, color, religion, and national origin.32  For example, Title 
VII provides that it is unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”33  Further, the 1964 Act created the Equal Employment Opportunity 
  
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. at 928.  
 28. Id. at 925–27. 
 29. Id. at 927.  
 30. 1964, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (last visited Oct. 2, 2019), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/milestones/1964.html [perma.cc/V4GC-
S2GT]. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id.  
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018). 
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Commission (the “EEOC”) to assist in eliminating unlawful employment dis-
crimination.34 
The Civil Rights Act of 1968 (the “1968 Act”), a supplement to the 1964 
Act, was signed into law on April 11, 1968.35  Title VIII of the 1968 Act, which 
addresses discrimination in housing, is known as the Fair Housing Act of 
1968.36  Within a year of the law’s enaction, HUD wrote a Title VIII Field 
Operations Handbook and created a formalized complaint process.37  The FHA 
“protects people from discrimination when they are renting or buying a home, 
getting a mortgage, seeking housing assistance, or engaging in other housing-
related activities.”38  The FHA prohibits discrimination based on race, color, 
national origin, religion, sex, familial status, and disability.39 
Specifically, the FHA makes it illegal to “refuse to sell or rent after the 
making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, 
or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of 
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin” in most circum-
stances.40  Additionally, the FHA prohibits the creation and publication of “any 
notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwell-
ing that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, 
color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention 
to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.”41  Various other 
practices are forbidden by the FHA as well.42  Sexual orientation, however, is 
not explicitly protected by this statute. 
While Title VII and the FHA are distinct, the laws are similar.  Both stat-
utes use identical language in forbidding discrimination “because of” an indi-
vidual’s sex.43  The statutes were passed within five years of each other, and 
the 1968 Act is intended to supplement the 1964 Act.44  Finally, courts have 
determined decisions under Title VII can apply with equal force to the FHA.45 
  
 34. 1964, supra note 30. 
 35. History of Fair Housing, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV. (last vis-
ited Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_hous-
ing_equal_opp/aboutfheo/history [perma.cc/LZG9-5Y8B]. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id.  
 38. Housing Discrimination Under the Fair Housing Act, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING 
AND URBAN DEV. (last visited Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.hud.gov/program_of-
fices/fair_housing_equal_opp/fair_housing_act_overview [perma.cc/7KP9-EASE]. 
 39. Id.  
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2018). 
 41. § 3604(c). 
 42. See § 3604(b), (d). 
 43. § 3604(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018). 
 44. History of Fair Housing, supra note 35; 1964, supra note 30. 
 45. Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC, 901 F.3d 856, 862 (7th Cir. 
2018), cert. dismissed 139 S.Ct. 1249 (2019) (mem). 
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B.  Early Decisions 
Even though federal statutes often do not explicitly list sexual orientation 
as a protected class, individuals have argued discrimination based on sexual 
orientation is a form of sex discrimination, and, as such, is unlawful.  Until 
recently, federal circuit courts have dismissed this argument and held that dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation is not prohibited.    
In Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit opined on whether sexual orientation is pro-
tected by Title VII.46  There, plaintiff Williamson contended his supervisor 
falsely accused him of interrupting workflow by discussing the details of his 
gay lifestyle and of harassing another employee.47  Williamson argued he was 
discriminated against based on his race because white employees engaging in 
similar behavior were not punished.48  The trial court granted summary judg-
ment for A.G. Edwards & Sons and determined Williamson believed he was 
treated differently due to his sexual orientation, not his race.49  The Eighth Cir-
cuit affirmed, summarily stating that “Title VII does not prohibit discrimina-
tion against homosexuals.”50   
Most other circuits have adopted a similar rule.51  Before revisiting this 
issue, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined 
that Title VII, in prohibiting discrimination based on sex, implied that “it is 
unlawful to discriminate against women because they are women and against 
men because they are men.”52  The court further stated that, based on the lack 
of legislative history regarding, and the circumstances surrounding, the sex 
amendment, Congress clearly “never considered nor intended that this [] legis-
lation apply to anything other than the traditional concept of sex.”53  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that “[d]ischarge for homo-
sexuality is not prohibited by Title VII . . . .”54  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded “Title VII’s prohibition of ‘sex’ dis-
crimination applies only to discrimination on the basis of gender and should 
  
 46. Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. (citing DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir.1979), 
abrogated by Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 51. See supra note 4 (noting the approaches of other circuits). 
 52. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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not be judicially extended to include sexual preference such as homosexual-
ity.”55  While these decisions quickly dismissed the contention that sexual ori-
entation is a protected characteristic, more recent decisions have been more 
sympathetic. 
C.  Intermediate Decisions 
In intermediate rulings, courts continued to determine that discrimination 
based on sexual orientation was not unlawful, but the decisions were more sup-
portive of plaintiffs and, in some cases, suggested alternative claims that might 
succeed. 
In a 1999 decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
considered whether harassment based on sexual orientation was sufficient to 
sustain a hostile work environment claim.56  The court ultimately determined 
that Title VII did not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.57  The 
First Circuit, however, condemned harassment based on sexual orientation, 
stating that “it is a noxious practice, deserving of censure and opprobrium.”58  
Yet, this was a matter of statutory construction, not moral judgment, so protec-
tion was not extended.59  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, when considering a Title VII claim alleging harassment based on sex-
ual orientation, expressed a similar sentiment in 2000.60  The court held that 
Title VII does not proscribe discrimination based on sexual orientation but 
noted that the alleged conduct was “morally reprehensible whenever and in 
whatever context it occurs, particularly in the modern workplace.”61 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Bibby v. Phil-
adelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co., explained that Title VII does not prohibit 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.62  The court further mentioned that 
Congress has repeatedly rejected attempts to extend Title VII’s protection to 
sexual orientation.63  Yet, the court noted that “[h]arassment on the basis of 
sexual orientation has no place in our society.”64  Additionally, the Third Cir-
  
 55. DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329–30 (9th Cir. 1979), abro-
gated by Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 56. Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 256 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 57. Id. at 259.  
 58. Id.  
 59. Id.  
 60. See Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2000), overruled by Zarda 
v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 116 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 61. Id. at 35.  
 62. Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 
2001) (citing Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35). 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 265 (citing Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35). 
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cuit suggested some alternative methods to prove that sexual orientation dis-
crimination constitutes unlawful sex discrimination.65  For example, an indi-
vidual could show that “the harasser was motivated by sexual desire, the har-
asser was expressing a general hostility to the presence of one sex in the work-
place, or the harasser was acting to punish the victim’s noncompliance with 
gender stereotypes.”66  The court also expressed that there may be other ways 
to show discrimination based on sexual orientation occurred because of sex.67  
While these decisions still denied protection, they provided a basis for the con-
tinued evolution of the law. 
D.  Recent Decisions 
In revisiting whether discrimination based on sexual orientation consti-
tutes unlawful sex discrimination, some courts continue to follow precedent.  
Others, though, have found sexual orientation is protected, leading to a circuit 
split. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed a 
Title VII claim based on sexual orientation discrimination in Evans v. Georgia 
Regional Hospital.68  In that case, the plaintiff worked as a security officer at 
Georgia Regional Hospital.69  As an employee of the hospital, Evans did not 
receive equal work or pay.70  Further, Evans was “physically assaulted or bat-
tered,” harassed, and targeted for termination because she failed to “carry her-
self in a ‘traditional woman[ly] manner.’”71  Evans alleged that the discrimina-
tion occurred because of her sexual orientation, as well as her gender non-con-
formity, and that she was retaliated against when she filed a complaint with the 
human resources department.72  The trial court dismissed the case with preju-
dice.73  The Eleventh Circuit determined Evans did not have a valid sexual 
orientation discrimination claim in light of the circuit’s prior precedent, which 
stated that “[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII . . . .”74  
  
 65. Id. at 264.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S.Ct. 557 (2017).  In Bostock v. Clayton County Board of Commissioners, 
a case currently on appeal to the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit relied on Evans 
while affirming the trial court’s dismissal of a Title VII claim based on sexual orienta-
tion discrimination.  723 F. App’x 964, 965 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. granted sub nom. 
Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019). 
 69. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1251.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 1250.  
 73. Id. at 1253.  
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The court followed this decision, as precedent can only be overturned by a clear 
ruling of the United States Supreme Court or by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en 
banc.75 
In 2017, the Seventh Circuit revisited this issue in Hively v. Ivy Tech Com-
munity College of Indiana.76  Hively was an openly lesbian adjunct professor 
teaching at Ivy Tech’s South Bend Campus.77  The school denied Hively’s ap-
plications for a full-time position and did not renew her part-time contract.78  
Hively, alleging that she was discriminated against based on her sexual orien-
tation, obtained a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC79 and filed a claim in fed-
eral court.80  Ivy Tech filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that sexual orientation 
was not a protected class.81  The trial court granted the motion, and Hively 
appealed.82 
Previous Seventh Circuit precedent held that “Congress had nothing more 
than the traditional notion of ‘sex’ in mind when it voted to outlaw sex discrim-
ination.”83  The court mentioned that even though the Supreme Court has not 
directly addressed this issue, many recent opinions are relevant to the question 
at hand.84  For example, the Supreme Court has held that gender stereotyping 
constitutes sex discrimination,85 determined that harassment by a member of 
the same sex can be sex discrimination,86 and recognized that same-sex mar-
riage is constitutionally protected.87  In Hively, the Seventh Circuit noted that 
deciding whether discrimination based on sexual orientation constitutes unlaw-
ful sex discrimination “is a pure question of statutory interpretation and thus 
well within the judiciary’s competence.”88 
  
 75. Id. (quoting Offshore of the Palm Beaches, Inc. v. Lynch, 741 F.3d 1251, 1256 
(11th Cir. 2014)). 
 76. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 343 (7th Cir. 2017) (en 
banc). 
 77. Id. at 341.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Before employees or job applicants can file a lawsuit alleging discrimination 
in violation of federal law, they must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and 
obtain a Notice of Right to Sue.  Filing a Lawsuit, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM. 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfm 
[perma.cc/2LTP-XH23].  However, the are some exceptions to this general rule, such 
as age discrimination or equal pay lawsuits.  Id. 
 80. Hively, 853 F.3d at 341. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. (quoting Doe v. Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 572 (7th Cir. 1997)), cert. 
granted, judgment vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998). 
 84. Id. at 342.  
 85. Id. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)). 
 86. Id. (citing Onacle v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 573 U.S. 75 (1998)). 
 87. Id. (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015)). 
 88. Id. at 343.  
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The court explained that there are many approaches to statutory interpre-
tation, such as focusing on the language of the statute, delving into legislative 
history, examining subsequent actions of the legislature, or some combination 
of these methods.89  Of course, if the statute is clear, there is no need to examine 
legislative history or other sources, even if the language is not perfectly 
straightforward.90  The court acknowledged that this method is more contro-
versial when the language embodies unintended consequences.91  In these cir-
cumstances, some courts suggest turning to legislative history.92  The failure to 
include a protected class or amend a statute, however, could be the result of 
many factors.93  Congress might be pleased with the statute or perhaps legisla-
tive gridlock is due to logrolling rather than the merits of the legislation.94 
The court used multiple methods to determine that discrimination based 
on sexual orientation is a subset of sex discrimination.95  First, the court utilized 
the comparative method, which asks if the plaintiff would have been treated 
the same way had his or her sex been different.96  The true question, the Seventh 
Circuit noted, is whether the plaintiff’s protected characteristic played a role in 
the discrimination.97  Consequently, other variables, such as the sex of the 
plaintiff’s partner, should remain constant.98  Using this analysis, the court de-
termined that Hively was disadvantaged because she was a woman, as Ivy Tech 
did not have an anti-marriage policy that extended to heterosexual couples.99  
Further, Hively was treated differently because she did not conform to gender 
stereotypes, namely being heterosexual.100  The court explained that a “policy 
that discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation does not affect every 
woman, or every man, but it is based on assumptions about the proper behavior 
for someone of a given sex.”101  The court ultimately determined that the dis-
crimination would not have occurred if Hively’s sex was not considered.102 
Next, the court applied an association theory.103  Courts have recognized 
that individuals who are treated differently based on the protected characteristic 
of a person with whom they associate are disadvantaged due to their own 
  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 343–44.  
 95. Id. at 345.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 345–46.  
 100. Id. at 346.  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. at 346–47. 
 103. Id. at 347. 
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traits.104  The Supreme Court first recognized this type of discrimination in 
Loving v. Virginia.105  There, the Supreme Court “held that ‘restricting the free-
dom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central mean-
ing of the Equal Protection Clause.’”106  Essentially, both parties to the inter-
racial marriage were denied important rights solely because of their race.107  
Courts have applied this rationale to Title VII’s proscription on race discrimi-
nation.108  The Hively court explained that the same analysis applies to discrim-
ination based on sex, as the statute’s text draws no distinction between the pro-
tected categories listed.109  The Seventh Circuit reserved additional complica-
tions, such as religious concerns, for future consideration.110 
According to Judge Diane S. Sykes’s dissenting opinion, statutes should 
be interpreted by giving words their “ordinary, contemporary, common mean-
ing.”111  Consequently, the dissent argued, the statute should be interpreted 
considering the common meaning of sex in 1964.  Judge Sykes argued that in 
1964, sex meant biologically male or female.112  Additionally, to a fluent 
speaker of English, sex does not encompass sexual orientation, and the terms 
are not used interchangeably.113  In support of this contention, Judge Sykes 
referenced various statutes that protect both sex and sexual orientation.114  
Therefore, she concluded that sexual orientation should be considered a sepa-
rate category of discrimination, not a subset of sex discrimination.115  The dis-
sent further argued that the majority used the comparative test incorrectly be-
cause its analysis changed not only Hively’s sex but also Hively’s sexual ori-
entation.116  Judge Sykes argued the proper test must be whether the employer 
treats gay men the same as lesbians.117 
The dissent also determined that sex stereotyping is not implicated by 
sexual orientation discrimination, as heterosexuality is not a sex-specific stere-
otype.118  An employer does not insist that employees match a stereotype spe-
cific to their sex but instead that they match the conventional sexual orientation, 
regardless of whether they are male or female.119  The dissent then argued the 
  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 383 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)). 
 106. Id. (citing Loving, 383 U.S. at 12). 
 107. Id. at 347.  
 108. Id. at 347–48. 
 109. Id. at 349. 
 110. Id. at 352.  
 111. Id. at 362 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (quoting Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 571 
U.S. 220, 227 (2014)). 
 112. Id. (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 113. Id. (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 114. Id. at 363–64 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 115. Id. at 364–65 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 116. Id. at 366 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 117. Id. (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. at 370 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 119. Id. (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
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majority’s reliance on Loving was misplaced.120  Judge Sykes determined that 
Loving rested on the conclusion that miscegenation laws are inherently racist 
because those laws used racial classifications to promote white supremacy.121  
However, Judge Sykes differentiated sexual orientation discrimination as not 
inherently sexist because it does not aim to promote the supremacy of one 
sex.122  The dissent believed that Congress, rather than the courts, should pro-
vide a remedy for discrimination based on sexual orientation.123 
The Second Circuit, in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., concluded that 
sexual orientation discrimination is, in part, motivated by sex.124  As a result, 
discrimination based on sexual orientation is a subset of sex discrimination.125  
In Zarda, the plaintiff was a skydiving instructor.126  Given the nature of the 
work, which often involved close physical proximity, instructors frequently 
joked with customers in an effort to make them feel more comfortable.127  In 
June 2010, Zarda told a female client “he was gay ‘and ha[d] an ex-husband to 
prove it.’”128  He said this was an attempt to preempt potential discomfort, but 
the client alleged Zarda inappropriately touched her and used his sexual orien-
tation as an excuse.129  The incident was reported to Zarda’s boss, and he was 
quickly fired.130  Zarda denied participating in any inappropriate behavior and 
insisted he was dismissed due to his sexual orientation.131 
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant regarding 
Zarda’s sex stereotyping claim, as the Second Circuit previously held gender 
stereotyping claims cannot be based on sexual orientation.132  Initially, a panel 
of Second Circuit judges declined Zarda’s invitation to reconsider the court’s 
prior rulings because precedent can only be changed by the court sitting en 
banc.133  After the panel decision, the Second Circuit granted en banc review.134   
In Zarda, the Second Circuit addressed the contention that an employee 
can be fired for sexual orientation without reference to sex.135  For example, an 
employer, when communicating the reason why a male employee was fired, 
would state “I fired him because he is gay” not “I fired him because he was a 
  
 120. Id. at 367 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 121. Id. at 368 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 122. Id. (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 123. Id. at 372 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 124. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 112 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. at 108.  
 127. Id.  
 128. Id.  
 129. Id.  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. at 109.  
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at 110. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at 113. 
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man.”136  However, the court noted that even if an employer does not reference 
sex, the employee is still a man that is attracted to men.137  As such, “firing a 
man because he is attracted to men is a decision motivated, at least in part, by 
sex.”138 
The Second Circuit further addressed the argument that an individual in 
1964, when Title VII was first passed, would never believe that discrimination 
based on sex also prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation.139  The 
court explained that, if this were true, the same could be said for other forms 
of discrimination prohibited by Title VII.140  For example, sexual harassment 
and hostile work environment claims were not originally covered by Title 
VII.141  Congress simply could not include all types of discrimination against 
protected classes, so courts are responsible for “giv[ing] effect to the broad 
language that Congress used.”142  As the Supreme Court has said, statutory 
provisions often go beyond the primary evil to cover reasonably similar 
evils.143  Finally, the Second Circuit explained that the text, rather than the main 
concerns of the legislature, is the lodestar of statutory interpretation.144 
The court found that the test for determining whether sex discrimination 
occurred reaffirms the result.145  Courts determine whether a basis for discrim-
ination is a function of sex by ascertaining whether the treatment would have 
been different but for the person’s sex.146  In applying this test to sexual orien-
tation, the court looked at the facts of Hively.147  Under those circumstances, if 
Hively were a man attracted to women, she would not have been denied a pro-
motion.148  Therefore, Hively would not have been discriminated against but 
for her sex.149  The Second Circuit then turned to the government’s contention 
that the true comparison should be between a gay man and a lesbian.150  The 
court, however, rejected this argument and explained that for the comparative 
  
 136. Id.  
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at 114.  
 139. Id.  
 140. Id.  
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. at 115 (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 276 (1982)). 
 143. Id. (quoting Onacle v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 53 U.S. 75, 79–80 
(1998)). 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. at 116.  
 146. Id. (citing L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 
(1978)). 
 147. Id. (citing Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 
2017)). 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id.  
 150. Id.  
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test “the trait is the control, sex is the independent variable, and employee treat-
ment is the dependent variable.”151   
The court then provided an example of the application of this test.152  In 
City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power v. Manhart,153 the Su-
preme Court analyzed whether the Department of Water and Power’s practice 
of requiring female employees to make larger pension contributions was dis-
criminatory.154  In doing so, the Supreme Court looked at “whether the evi-
dence shows ‘treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person’s sex 
would be different.’”155  The Second Circuit noted that life expectancy is a sex-
dependent trait because when an individual’s sex is changed that person’s life 
expectancy also changes.156  As a result, the Supreme Court determined that 
the pension system was merely a proxy for sex discrimination.157  The Zarda 
court, conducting a similar analysis, explained that “a woman who is subject 
to an adverse employment action because she is attracted to women would have 
been treated differently if she had been a man who was attracted to women.”158  
As such, discrimination based on sexual orientation is a function of sex and a 
subset of sex discrimination.159   
Next, the Second Circuit performed a gender stereotyping analysis.160  
The Supreme Court has determined that employment decisions cannot be based 
on typical impressions about males and females.161  For example, “adverse em-
ployment actions taken based on the belief that a female [employee] should 
walk, talk, and dress femininely constitute[s] impermissible sex discrimina-
tion.”162  To determine if something is a gender stereotype, the court looked to 
whether an individual would have been treated differently had he or she been 
a member of a different sex.163  The court concluded that “when . . . ‘an em-
ployer . . . acts on the basis of a belief that [men] cannot be [attracted to men], 
or that [they] must not be,’ but takes no such action against women who are 
attracted to men, the employer ‘has acted on the basis of gender.’”164   
  
 151. Id. at 116–17.  
 152. Id. at 117.  
 153. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
 154. Id. at 704–05. 
 155. Id. at 711 (internal citations omitted).  
 156. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 117. 
 157. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711. 
 158. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 119. 
 159. Id.  
 160. Id.  
 161. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707. 
 162. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 119 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 
250–52 (1989)). 
 163. Id. at 120 (citing Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 
107, 120 n.10 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
 164. Id. at 120–21 (en banc) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 
250 (1989)) (alterations in the original).  
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In support of this notion, the Second Circuit noted that courts have previ-
ously attempted to draw lines between gender stereotypes that create valid 
claims of sex discrimination and those that constitute discrimination based on 
sexual orientation.165  The court determined that a line need not be drawn be-
cause sexual orientation discrimination is rooted in gender stereotypes.166  In 
response, the government argued that even if sexual orientation discrimination 
is based on gender stereotypes, it is not unlawful because men and women are 
treated the same.167  The court rejected this argument, stating that “an employer 
who discriminates against employees based on assumptions about the gender 
to which the employees can or should be attracted has engaged in sex-discrim-
ination irrespective of whether the employer uses a double-edged sword that 
cuts both men and women.”168  Consistent with Hively, the Second Circuit de-
termined associational discrimination reinforces that sexual orientation dis-
crimination is a subset of sex discrimination.169  Yet, the majority did not ex-
press an opinion on whether an exception might be appropriate for “discrimi-
natory conduct rooted in religious beliefs.”170 
While Hively and Zarda analyzed Title VII, the Seventh Circuit extended 
Hively’s rationale to the FHA in Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Commu-
nity.171  In that case, Wetzel moved to St. Andrew, a living community for older 
adults.172  Wetzel spoke to the staff, as well as other residents, about her sexual 
orientation, but she was met with animosity, including verbal and physical 
abuse, from other residents.173  The various incidents were reported, but St. 
Andrew did nothing to help Wetzel.174  In fact, St. Andrew responded by retal-
iating against Wetzel.175  For example, St. Andrew substantially barred Wetzel 
from the lobby, halted her cleaning services, and moved her to a less optimal 
dining area.176  Eventually, Wetzel sued under the FHA, alleging that St. An-
drew did not provide a non-discriminatory living environment and that she was 
retaliated against for complaining about the harassment.177  In deciding whether 
  
 165. Id. at 124 (citing Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 830 F.3d 698, 705–
09 (7th Cir. 2017)), vacated by 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 166. Id. at 122. 
 167. Id. at 123.  
 168. Id.  
 169. Id. at 124.  
 170. Id. at 122, n.22. 
 171. Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC, 901 F.3d 856, 862 (7th Cir. 
2018), cert. dismissed 139 S. Ct. 1249 (2019) (mem). 
 172. Id. at 859.  
 173. Id. at 860.  
 174. Id.  
 175. Id.  
 176. Id.  
 177. Id. at 861.  
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sexual orientation discrimination constituted discrimination based on sex, the 
Seventh Circuit stated that Hively applied with equal force under the FHA.178 
Despite these recent decisions the Eastern District of Missouri, in Walsh, 
was bound by Eighth Circuit precedent, which has not been revisited and 
clearly states that sexual orientation is not a protected characteristic.179 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In Walsh, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Mis-
souri granted Friendship Village’s motion for judgment on the pleadings be-
cause sexual orientation is not a protected class under Eighth Circuit prece-
dent.180  The court first explained that the FHA covers multiple classes but does 
not explicitly protect sexual orientation.181  The court then addressed the claim 
that Walsh and Nance were treated less favorably because of their sex.182  The 
Eastern District noted Walsh and Nance did not adduce any evidence showing 
that men in a same-sex relationship would have been admitted to Friendship 
Village.183  As a result, the court determined the claims were truly based on 
sexual orientation, not just sex,184 and the Eighth Circuit has “held that ‘Title 
VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals.’”185  Additionally, 
the court referenced other decisions that have determined sexual orientation is 
not protected by the FHA.186  The Eastern District, however, acknowledged 
that other courts have recently held that discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation is in fact a form of sex discrimination.187  Yet, because the court was 
bound by Eighth Circuit precedent, the claim was denied.188 
Next, the court considered the claim that Walsh and Nance were treated 
less favorably due to their association with a person of a particular sex.189  
Walsh and Nance specifically argued that if one of them were a man, they 
  
 178. Id. at 862.  
 179. Walsh v. Friendship Vill. of S. Cty., 352 F. Supp. 3d 920, 926 (E.D. Mo. 2019), 
appeal docketed, No. 19-1395 (8th Cir. Feb. 27, 2019) (citing Williamson v. A.G. Ed-
wards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989)). 
 180. Id. at 925–27. 
 181. Id. at 925.  
 182. Id.  
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. at 925–26. 
 185. Id. at 926 (quoting Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 
(8th Cir. 1989)). 
 186. Id. (citing Fair Housing Ctr. of Washtenaw Cty., Inc. v. Town and Country 
Apartments, No. 07–10262, 2009 WL 497402, at *7 n.1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2009)). 
 187. Id. (citing Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 113 (2d Cir. 2018) 
(en banc)). 
 188. Id.  
 189. Id.  
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would not have been denied housing.190  Thus, but for their sex, Friendship 
Village’s decision would have been different.191  The court agreed that associ-
ational discrimination claims are sometimes valid but denied Walsh and 
Nance’s assertion because they did not show that these claims are actionable 
when the class at issue is not statutorily protected.192 
Finally, the court turned to the sex stereotyping claim.193  Courts have 
allowed gender stereotyping claims under Title VII when such stereotyping 
impacts employment decisions.194  Yet, these claims are rejected when they are 
used as a proxy for sexual orientation discrimination claims.195  Courts usually 
try “to distinguish between discrimination based on stereotypical notions of 
femininity and masculinity and that based on sexual orientation, determining 
the former is actionable under Title VII while the latter is not.”196  Here, the 
court determined that this claim need not be addressed because the stereotyping 
was based only on sexual orientation – an unprotected class – and thus, the 
claim could not stand.197 
For the above reasons, the Eastern District granted Friendship Village’s 
motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Walsh and Nance’s 
amended complaint.198  In February 2019, Walsh and Nance filed an appeal to 
the Eighth Circuit.199 
V.  COMMENT 
While early decisions determined sexual orientation is not a protected 
class under federal statutes, courts are now reaching different results.  Two 
federal circuits have changed their position, and other circuits continue to face 
this issue.  This Part will examine the close relationship between discrimination 
based on sex and discrimination based on sexual orientation by looking to Su-
preme Court precedent, as well as the plain language of Title VII and the FHA.  
Ultimately, this Part argues that discrimination based on sexual orientation is a 
subset of sex discrimination. 
  
 190. Id.  
 191. Id. at 926–27. 
 192. Id. at 927.  
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. (quoting Hunter v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 697 F.3d 697, 702 (8th Cir. 
2012)). 
 195. Id. (citing Pambianchi v. Ark. Tech Univ., No. 4:13-CV-00046-KGB, 2014 
WL 11498236, at *5 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 14, 2014)). 
 196. Id. (quoting Pambianchi, 2014 WL 11498236, at *5). 
 197. Id. at 927–28. 
 198. Id. at 928.  
 199. Id.  The appeal will be held in abeyance until the Supreme Court issues a de-
cision in Zarda and Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia. 
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A.  Supreme Court Precedent 
The inclusion of sexual orientation discrimination as a subset of sex dis-
crimination is reasonable when considered in light of Supreme Court prece-
dent.  Treating individuals differently based on traits not explicitly protected in 
statutes can constitute unlawful discrimination if those traits are a proxy for, or 
a function of, a protected characteristic.  For example, the Supreme Court has 
determined that treating individuals differently based on life expectancy con-
stitutes unlawful sex discrimination.200  In Manhart, the defendant required fe-
males to make larger pension contributions than men because, on average, 
women live longer.201  Life expectancy is a sex-dependent trait, so altering an 
individual’s sex would change life expectancy, and consequently, the applica-
tion of the pension policy.202  Because life expectancy is a function of sex, the 
pension policy treated employees differently due to their sex, which is prohib-
ited by the statute. 
In terms of sexual orientation, changing an individual’s sex leads to dif-
ferent treatment.  The Second Circuit has explained that a “but for” test is used 
to determine whether a given trait serves as a proxy for, or a function of, sex.203  
In Hively, the plaintiff was a lesbian, but had she been a male, she would have 
been heterosexual.204  If this were the case, Hively would not have been denied 
her promotion.205  Just as changing an individual’s sex necessarily alters an 
individual’s life expectancy, changing an individual’s sex necessarily alters 
that person’s sexual orientation.  In other words, sexual orientation is, in part, 
dependent on an individual’s sex. Thus, when individuals are treated differ-
ently based on their sexual orientation, they are treated differently, in part, be-
cause of sex. 
Gender stereotyping jurisprudence further supports the notion that sex 
discrimination encompasses sexual orientation discrimination.  Individuals 
cannot be treated adversely based on a failure to comply with generalizations 
about their gender.206  Gay individuals “represent[] the ultimate . . . failure to 
conform to [gender] stereotype[s] (at least as understood in a place such as 
modern America, which views heterosexuality as the norm and other forms of 
sexuality as exceptional): [they are] not heterosexual.”207  Some argue that het-
erosexuality is not a sex-specific stereotype but rather an insistence that indi-
viduals match the typical sexual orientation irrespective of sex.208  Yet, this 
  
 200. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978). 
 201. Id. at 704–05. 
 202. Id. at 711.  
 203. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 116 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 204. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017)). 
 205. Id. at 345.  
 206. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 120. 
 207. Hively, 853 F.3d at 346. 
 208. Id. at 370 (Sykes, J. dissenting). 
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view is too wide.  Sex-specific stereotypes emerge when a preference for het-
erosexuality is applied on an individual level.  For example, asking a male to 
conform to the usual sexual orientation requires that man to marry a woman.  
The reverse would be true for a woman that is asked to conform to the standard 
sexual orientation.  So, at a general level, requiring heterosexuality does not 
create stereotypes specific to males or females, but, on the individual level, 
people are treated adversely due to their failure to conform with a quintessential 
gender stereotype – that males should be attracted to females and vice versa.  
Finally, some maintain that this form of sex stereotyping is not prohibited be-
cause men and women are treated the same.209  Yet, two wrongs do not make 
a right, and impermissible discrimination has occurred even if “a double-edged 
sword” was used to cut both men and women.210   
Associational discrimination provides another basis for determining that 
sexual orientation is protected under the “because of” sex language.  This type 
of discrimination was first recognized in the context of miscegenation stat-
utes.211  In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court determined that a Virginia 
law criminalizing interracial marriages was impermissibly based on race and 
therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause.212  While Loving was decided 
on constitutional grounds, courts have held that constitutional determinations 
can provide guidance in the statutory context.213  In fact, circuit courts have 
extended this rationale to statutes and determined that if an action is taken 
against a person due to their association with another race, then that person has 
been discriminated against based on his or her own race.214  Associational dis-
crimination has a similar application to sexual orientation.  A person’s sexual 
orientation depends not only on the sex of the individual but also on the sex of 
one’s partner.  Consequently, discrimination based on sexual orientation is, in 
part, based on an individual’s association with a member of the same sex, and 
adverse treatment due to this association constitutes discrimination based on 
that individual’s own sex.  Some argue the rationale of cases addressing race 
discrimination should not be extended to this context because of differences in 
these types of discrimination.215  However, the text of both Title VII and the 
  
 209. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 123. 
 210. Id.  
 211. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2, 12 (1967). 
 212. Id. at 12.  
 213. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 582 (2009). 
 214. Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 
1986) (“Where a plaintiff claims discrimination based upon an interracial marriage or 
association, he alleges, by definition, that he has been discriminated against because of 
his race.”) (emphasis added); Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 139 (2nd Cir. 2008) 
(“[W]here an employee is subjected to adverse action because an employer disapproves 
of interracial association, the employee suffers discrimination because of the em-
ployee’s own race.”) (emphasis added); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 
F.3d 339, 348 (7th Cir. 2017) (adopting the analysis used in Holcomb). 
 215. Hively, 853 F.3d at 368 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
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FHA do not draw a distinction between discrimination based on race and dis-
crimination based on sex.216 
B.  Statutory Interpretation 
The plain language of the statute further reinforces that discrimination 
based on sexual orientation is, in part, a function of an individual’s sex.  Title 
VII and the FHA prohibit discrimination “because of” sex.217  Sexual orienta-
tion meets this test because discrimination based on someone’s sexual orienta-
tion is partially predicated on an individual’s sex.  Black’s Law Dictionary de-
fines sexual orientation as “‘[a] person’s predisposition or inclination toward 
sexual activity or behavior with other males or females’ and is commonly cat-
egorized as ‘heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality.’”218  Additionally, 
Merriam Webster defines gay as “of, relating to, or characterized by a tendency 
to direct sexual desire toward another of the same sex.”219  Consequently, sex-
ual orientation is predicated on both the sex of the individual and the sex of 
those to whom he or she is attracted.  As the majority in Zarda explained, one 
cannot fully define sexual orientation without identifying an individual’s sex, 
and, as such, sex plays a role in sexual orientation discrimination.220   
Some argue that, to the average person, sex is distinct from sexual orien-
tation.221  While this is true to an extent, sex still plays a role in the average 
person’s perception of sexual orientation.  Individuals invariably consider the 
sex of a person, as well as the sex of that person’s partner, when determining a 
person’s sexual orientation.  Even though these two traits are distinct, there is 
an overlap because determining whether one is gay must be based, in part, on 
that person’s sex.  The connection can be shown by the applying the “but for” 
test utilized in Zarda.222  For example, if a woman is in a romantic relationship 
with another woman, she is a lesbian, while a man in a relationship with a 
woman is heterosexual.223  In short, sex and sexual orientation are connected 
because changing one’s sex also alters that person’s sexual orientation.224 
Even though the plain language of both Title VII and the FHA fairly en-
compass sexual orientation discrimination, legislative intent poses an issue.  Of 
course, inquiry into legislative intent is unnecessary when a statute is plain on 
  
 216. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018). 
 217. § 3604(a); § 2000e-2(a)(1).  
 218. Sexual Orientation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 219. Gay, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (last visited Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/gay [perma.cc/YVL7-S9V4]. 
 220. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 113 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 221. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 362 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 222. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 116. 
 223. Id.  
 224. Id.  
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its face.225  Further, “the text is the lodestar of statutory interpretation.”226  
Courts defer to the text of statutes, rather than legislative intent, for various 
reasons.  First, courts are tasked with giving effect to the broad language of a 
statute.227  The Supreme Court has explained that statutes “often go beyond the 
principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the pro-
visions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by 
which we are governed.”228  Second, legislative intent can be unreliable.229  
Records might be poorly kept, and there are often multiple explanations for 
why a law did not pass.  For example, unpopular amendments might be at-
tached to a bill or lobbying might influence the legislative process.  Addition-
ally, members of Congress might not propose laws in the first instance because 
they believe other issues are more pressing.  The complications worsen when 
one attempts to understand why Congress has neglected to amend existing 
law.230  Perhaps Congress is content with the law as written, pleased with how 
courts have interpreted the statute, or gridlock prevents further legislation, re-
gardless of the merits of the proposed change.231   
The above concerns regarding legislative history, however, do not apply 
with similar force in this context.  Congressional intent can be safely intuited 
based on the circumstances that existed when these laws were passed.  In 1964, 
“homosexuality” was a crime, and gay people were believed to suffer from 
mental illness.232  In fact, the American Psychiatric Association and the Amer-
ican Psychological Association classified “homosexuality” as a mental disor-
der until 1973 and 1975, respectively.233  Based on these facts, sexual orienta-
tion discrimination does not appear to be a “reasonably comparable evil.”234  
Congress surely was not concerned with discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation when Title VII and the FHA were passed, given the prevailing attitude 
towards gay individuals at that time.  Thus, even if plain language favors in-
cluding sexual orientation as a protected characteristic, this interpretation is 
controversial.  As the Seventh Circuit explained in Hively, the results of statu-
tory interpretation are harder to accept when the language leads to unintended 
consequences,235 such as extending protection beyond legislative intent. 
  
 225. Hively, 853 F.3d at 343. 
 226. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 115 (citing Onacle v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 573 
U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998)). 
 227. Id.  
 228. Onacle, 573 U.S. at 79–80. 
 229. Hively, 853 F.3d at 343. 
 230. Id.  
 231. Id. at 343–44. 
 232. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 140 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) 
(Lynch, J., dissenting). 
 233. Id. (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
 234. Id. at 142 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
 235. Hively, 853 F.3d at 343. 
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A further concern is that an interpretation expanding the scope of discrim-
ination because of sex threatens the balance of power in the government.  The 
court is directly contravening legislative intent, at least from the time of the 
law’s enactment.  Congress, as a representative of the public, is tasked with 
creating law, and the judiciary serves to interpret the law.  Here, courts are 
overriding Congress and creating new law.  Thus, some argue that decisions 
involving the expansion of legislation should be left to our legislators.236   
Yet, there is importance in law being workable.  Over time, society pro-
gresses and public opinion changes.  As a result, giving new meaning to statutes 
can be justified.  As Judge Posner explained in his Hively concurrence: 
This is something courts do fairly frequently to avoid statutory obsoles-
cence and concomitantly to avoid placing the entire burden of updating 
old statutes on the legislative branch.  We should not leave the impres-
sion that we are merely the obedient servants of the 88th Congress 
(1963–1965), carrying out their wishes.  We are not.  We are taking 
advantage of what the last half century has taught.237 
While this view is often endorsed in constitutional jurisprudence,238 
courts have used statutory interpretation to give legislation a new meaning, one 
that comports with modern public opinion.239  For example, the Sherman An-
titrust Act was passed in 1890, but courts interpret that law in light of modern 
economics.240  Judicial interpretation has been used to update the Sherman Act, 
and this practice ensures that “old law satisf[ies] modern needs and understand-
ings.”241  Title VII and the FHA were passed in 1964 and 1968, respectively.242  
Much has changed in the fifty years since then – the fundamental right of mar-
riage has been constitutionally guaranteed to same-sex couples,243 and a ma-
jority of Americans now support same-sex marriage.244  Courts should “tak[e] 
advantage of what the last half century has taught,” rather than applying the 
congressional intent of 1964 and 1968, which is now antiquated and discon-
nected from modern sentiments.  
  
 236. See id. at 372 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 237. See id. at 357 (Posner, J., concurring). 
 238. Id. at 353–54. 
 239. Id. at 352. 
 240. Id.  
 241. Id.  
 242. 1964, supra note 30 (discussing the history of the 1964 Act, which includes 
Title VII); History of Fair Housing, supra note 35 (discussing the history of the FHA).  
 243. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015). 
 244. Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage: Public Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage, 
PEW RES. CTR. (May 14, 2019), https://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/changing-atti-
tudes-on-gay-marriage/ [perma.cc/XRU3-9KHC] (finding that, based on a 2019 sur-
vey, 61% of Americans support same-sex marriage while 31% are opposed).  
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The notion that discrimination based on sexual orientation is a type of 
unlawful sex discrimination is supported by Supreme Court precedent, as well 
as the plain language of Title VII and the FHA.  Although, as courts continue 
to alter their interpretation of federal statutes, additional issues will arise.  For 
example, the plaintiffs in Walsh were denied housing based on a policy in-
formed by religious beliefs.245  In both Hively and Zarda, however, the courts 
did not address how religious motivations might impact this new interpreta-
tion.246  As individuals continue to allege discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation, courts will be forced to resolve these complex issues. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Both Supreme Court precedent and the plain language of federal antidis-
crimination statutes indicate that discrimination based on sexual orientation is 
a subset of unlawful sex discrimination.  Yet, there are viable arguments on 
both sides, and the federal circuits remain split on this issue.  As courts continue 
to alter their interpretation of federal statutes, additional complications will 
likely appear.  Despite these potential issues, gay people deserve to be treated 
with “equal dignity in the eyes of the law,”247 and federal statutes, as well as 
the judiciary, should reinforce that notion. 
  
  
 245. Walsh v. Friendship Vill. of South Cty., 352 F. Supp. 3d 920, 923 (E.D. Mo. 
2019), docketed, No. 19-1395 (8th Cir. Feb. 27, 2019). 
 246. Hively, 853 F.3d at 352; Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 122 
n.22 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 247. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
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